When No One Else Will: Victims’ Rights and the Fight for Accountability

By: Meg Garvin, MA, JD, MsT

On the morning of the defendant’s domestic violence and stalking trial, the parties reached a plea agreement. The plea was entered. Sentencing proceeded. The case ended.

The victim, who had been subpoenaed to testify the next day, was not present and was not heard.

This is what happened in State v. Zeitler, 2026-Ohio-1843 (Ohio Ct. App. 9th Dist. May 20, 2026).

Represented by counsel, the victim challenged the outcome, arguing that the trial court erred by proceeding to sentencing without allowing her to exercise her constitutional and statutory rights under Ohio law. The appellate court agreed, reversing and remanding for a new sentencing hearing.

The case is significant for a number of reasons: the victim had an attorney; her ability to seek appellate review was recognized; the rights violations were acknowledged; and a remedy was afforded.

But the case highlights something broader: victims’ rights remain tenuous at the very moment where most criminal cases actually resolve – plea.

For decades, victims’ rights laws have rejected the notion that victims are merely evidentiary witnesses in a dispute between the state and the accused. The laws recognize victims as rights-bearing participants. Yet participation breaks down during plea processes.

Plea bargaining must be the focus

Since plea bargaining is the primary site of criminal adjudication, it must also be a primary site of victims’ rights.

The challenge is structural, however.

Rights to confer, to be notified, to be present, and to be heard are often treated as obligations that attach to scheduled hearings. But plea negotiations often occur in the hallway, in emails, and in conversations outside of formal proceedings. By the time the plea is entered, its terms are set.

The result:

• Notice becomes is retrospective
• Conferring becomes informational, not participatory
• Presence and victim allocution become symbolic

This is not participation.

Zeitler reveals why attorneys matter

Zeitler reveals just how much we need attorneys.

The victim in Zeitler had counsel. That attorney identified the violation and pursued appellate relief. These facts should not be overlooked. Without counsel, the violation may not have been litigated, and the rights would have remained hollow.

The appellate remedy of a new sentencing is an important remedy, and one that NCVLI regularly fights for. But a “do over” after plea and sentencing is not trauma-informed and is not efficient.

The question facing courts and practitioners alike is not whether victims have rights, or even whether remedies exist; courts are increasingly recognizing both. The question is whether and how victims’ rights can be enforced at the moment decisions are being made.

This is where the argument for victims’ counsel becomes unavoidable.

As I have argued elsewhere, the right to counsel for victims is not about converting victims into parties or displacing prosecutorial authority. It is about ensuring that independently afforded rights are meaningful.

Without attorneys, victims’ rights are contingent; contingent on prosecutorial bandwidth and priorities, judicial awareness and intervention, and victims’ ability to speak up before decisions are finalized.

In a plea-driven system, this is, at best, an unstable foundation for rights.

Participatory rights require representation

The lesson of Zeitler is not merely that appellate courts can fix violations. It is that too many violations are occurring because there is no effective mechanism to prevent them in the moment.

Victims’ rights are participation rights. But participation requires enforcement mechanisms that operate in real time.

If plea bargaining is where criminal cases are resolved, it must be where victims’ rights are protected. It must be where victims have counsel. Otherwise, victims’ rights will remain strong only on paper at the very moment they matter most in practice.

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