2025 CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS – YEAR IN REVIEW
SELECT STATE CASES

(Listed alphabetically by case name)

E.H. v. Slayton, 568 P.3d 377 (Ariz. 2025)

Following the murder of a six-year-old victim, the deceased victim’s half-sister sought more than $3 million in restitution for the child-victim’s future lost income. The trial court held that the half-sister could assert victims’ rights on behalf of herself and the deceased. The trial court went on, however, to determine that a murdered child’s future lost wages were unrecoverable under Arizona restitution law because they were “consequential damages”. The court of appeals agreed with the trial court. On further review, the Arizona Supreme Court recognized victims’ rights to “justice and due process” and to receive full restitution. The court articulated the 3-prong test: “restitution should be ordered for losses that (1) are economic; (2) would not have been incurred by the victim but for the criminal offense; and (3) were directly caused by the criminal conduct.” Noting that the issue was one of first impression, the court determined that future economic losses can qualify as “economic loss” if they meet the three-part test. In applying this test, the court found that the trial court did not consider whether the victim’s half-sister had demonstrated the amount of future lost wages. Consequently, the court reversed and remanded.

In re K.B., 2025 WL 811188, 2025 Ohio 854 (Ohio 2025)

At a combined proceeding in a procedurally complex matter involving combined cases, the state and the juvenile-defendant presented a plea agreement on a new case that implicated the other cases. The court asked about the victims. The state responded “The State has made contact with the named victims in this particular matter. They did not provide any victim impact statement and did not provide us any information to provide to the Court here today.” The victim of one of the underlying rape charges appealed, arguing that the trial court erred when it denied the victim the opportunity to be present and heard regarding imposition of the stayed sentence. The appellate court analyzed the victims’ rights found in state constitution and statute and determined that the law placed a mandatory duty on the State to provide notice to the victim of the proceedings. The court then reviewed the record and found nothing to indicate notice was provided to the victim. Consequently, the court held that the trial judge erred as a matter of law in denying the motion to impose the suspended sentence without providing the victim with notice and an opportunity to be heard. The court then reversed and
remanded for further proceedings.

Ramirez v. Marsh, 580 P.3d 768 (N.M. 2025)

In each of these two consolidated cases, defendants sought access to the victims’ U-Visa or T-Visa (collectively “Visas”); the victims objected; and the trial court ordered production. In each case, counsel for the victim petitioned for a writ of superintending control. Reviewing for an abuse of discretion, the appellate court recognized that a Visa application is confidential pursuant to federal law and concluded that the policies and principles underlying that law “support robust protection of [Visa] applicants’ privacy, and that this protection is best expressed as an evidentiary privilege.” The court went on to hold that neither the necessary disclosure to law enforcement required to complete the application nor disclosure of the fact of the application are a waiver of the privilege. The court also determined that the Code of Federal Regulation provides an additional bar to disclosure of a T-visa, and under the facts of the cases, attorney-client privilege also protected the application. The court rejected defendants’ arguments that due process and/or Brady require disclosure of the application itself when it is not in the hands of the prosecution. The court concluded that the prosecution is required only to disclose the fact of the Visa application and only if it is aware of such application. The court further concluded that neither the Compulsory Process Clause nor the Confrontation Clause require anything more. The court granted the writs of superintending control and directed the Rules of Evidence Committee to draft a new privilege for U/T-Visa applications consistent with the opinion.

State ex rel Gatehouse Media Ohio Holdings v. Columbus Police Department, 2025 WL 3274795, —N.E.3d — (Ohio 2025)

Following a police-involved shooting, a reporter for the Columbus Dispatch requested public records (e.g., bodycam, dashcam footage) from the Columbus Police Department (CPD) related to the shooting. CPD initially denied the request, citing several statutory exceptions, including the state constitutional victims’ rights (Marsy’s Law) and statutes protecting the privacy of crime victims. Eventually CPD released portions of the records but they were redacted to conceal the identities of the officers. Eventually the Columbus Dispatch petitioned for a writ of mandamus, seeking to compel disclosure. The court analyzed whether police officers are “victims” Marsy’s Law which defines “victim” as “a person against whom the criminal offense or delinquent act is committed or who is directly and proximately harmed by the commission of the offense or act.” The court held that police officers can be victims under Marsy’s Law, as they are persons against whom crimes can be committed. Consequently, the court held that CPD was justified in redacting the officers’ identifying information from the footage, and the petition was denied.

State v. Diaz, 585 P.3d 581 (NM Ct. App. 2025)

Defendant pleaded guilty to battery and was sentenced to incarceration and probation. Following a violation, the state filed a petition to revoke. At that hearing, the state presented the victim to speak. While the magistrate court agreed that the victim could be heard the magistrate limited the scope to the current violation. In light of this limitation the victim declined to speak. The state appealed the magistrate’s decision but the district court dismissed the appeal finding the state had no right to appeal, that the Defendant had received the maximum sentence, and there was no error in limiting the victim’s statement. The state sought further review. While the appellate court determined the case was moot because defendant had completed his sentence, it exercised its discretion to review the case. On review it held that the magistrate had erred. The court recognized that allowing the victim to offer a statement furthers key purposes of the Victims of Crime Act, including ensuring the full impact of crime is brought to the attention of the court and that victims are treated with dignity, respect, and sensitivity. While the court held that it could not grant the request to hold another probation revocation hearing, it did hold “that a victim has an unqualified constitutional and statutory right to give a statement at any and all post-conviction sentencing hearings, including probation revocation hearings.”

State v. Mallory, 2025 WL 3122472, 2025 Ohio 5064 (Ohio 2025)

Defendant stole the victim’s vehicle and led the police on a high-speed chance. Eventually Defendant lost control of the vehicle and crashed. Defendant was charged with failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer, and theft of a motor vehicle. After negotiations, a plea agreement was reached pursuant to which defendant would plead guilty to failure to comply; the state would dismiss the theft; and the parties would agree to a recommendation of restitution to the city. At the change of plea hearing the prosecutor noted the state’s intention to also seek restitution for the victim whose vehicle was stolen and the defendant indicated that he understood. The trial court then accepted the plea and set it for
disposition. The victim filed a notice of appeal, arguing that the trial court erred when it accepted a plea agreement that denied him the opportunity to confer, be heard, and request restitution prior to dismissal of the charge for which he was the victim. After concluding that the victim had standing to file an appeal. The court held that in a case where the victim was present at the plea hearing, the prosecutor acknowledged the victim’s presence on the record, the trial court’s failure to afford an opportunity to be heard was a violation of the victim’s right. The court then reversed the trial court’s judgement of entry of conviction and remanded for a new plea hearing at which the victim must be given a chance to be heard and the issue of restitution to the victim would be addressed.

State v. Ramirez, 22 N.W.3d 821 (Wis. 2025)

Petitioner, an inmate, stabbed a corrections officer. The state filed the complaint on February 1, 2016; on April 15, 2019 petitioner filed a pro se motion to dismiss the complaint, alleging, inter alia, that his speedy trial right had been infringed. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court denied the motion and on December 3, 2019 petitioner was convicted. Petitioner filed a postconviction motion to vacate the judgement and dismiss the case, alleging the delay in bringing him to trial violated his constitutional speedy trial right. The district court ruled against petitioner; the court of appeals reversed; and the state sought further review. Ultimately, the state supreme court reversed again, ruling that the defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial had not been violated. In concurrence, Chief Justice Karofsky wrote separately “to emphasize that [the Wisconsin] constitution and statutes require a court to balance the rights of victims alongside those of the State and defendants in speedy trial cases. In discussing the victims’ rights, she noted that the state victims’ rights “are to be protected ‘by law in a manner no less vigorous than the protections afforded to the accused’”. Ultimately she stated, “[w]hen a court is deciding whether to grant a motion for a continuance or a motion for a dismissal, it needs to consider the victim.”

State v. Reed, 268 N.E.3d 1191 (Ohio Ct. App. 2025)

Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal damaging, menacing, and trespass and was sentenced. After two years of community control and payment of fees and restitution, a hearing was held on defendant’s motion for early termination of community control. The victim was present at the hearing, and the state indicated that, based on the victim’s position, the state opposed the motion. Despite this, the trial court terminated probation. The victim then filed a hand written “Motion for New Hearing on Early Termination”, arguing he was denied the opportunity to address the court. The trial court filed a judgement entry on the victim’s motion noting that it had not been aware the victim wished to speak during the previous hearing, and scheduling a hearing at which the victim would “be granted up to five minutes to address the court”. The victim did not appear at that hearing. The victim appealed the original decision of the trial court to grant early termination. The appellate court recognized that Ohio law affords victims numerous rights, including the right to be heard, as well as standing to challenge a final order on sentencing. The court then noted that while the state had communicated the victim’s position to the trial court at the early termination hearing, the victim’s right is the right to be heard “orally, or in writing, or both.” The court determined this right had been violated. Noting that a trial court has no authority to reconsider a valid final judgment, the court found that the trial court’s scheduling of an additional hearing did not redress the violation of the victim’s rights because hearing from the victim at such a proceeding would not have been a meaningful opportunity to speak. The court then reversed and remanded.

State v. Thompson, 574 P.3d 542 (Wa. 2025)

Defendant moved to subpoena the medical records of the deceased victim and the mother of the deceased victim objected on the basis of the confidentiality of the records. Defendant did not object to the mother’s intervention at the trial court and the trial court denied the subpoenas. Following his conviction, Defendant raised numerous errors on appeal, including that it was error for the trial court to refuse to issue the subpoena. The mother of the deceased moved to intervene in the appeal on this issue. The intermediate appellate court granted the intervention over defendant’s objection. Defendant sought further review and the supreme court held that where a trial court has allowed a nonparty to intervene, the appellate court has discretion to allow that nonparty to intervene on appeal solely on the issue they participated in below.